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BEYOND THE VIOLENCE 
INDIAN AGRICULTURE, WHITE REMOVAL, AND 
THE UNLIKELY CONSTRUCTION OF THE NORTHERN 
CHEYENNE RESERVATION, 1876-1900 
JAMES R. ALLISON III 
Upon first glance, a specific act of vio-
lence seemed to fix the particular location 
of the Northern Cheyenne Reservation. On 
December 12, 1880, the prominent Northern 
Cheyenne chief, Little Wolf, staggered into a 
white-owned trading store near Fort Keogh, 
Montana Territory, and, in a drunken stupor, 
shot and killed a fellow Cheyenne named 
Starving Elk. Enraged at Starving Elk for gam-
bling with his daughter, Little Wolf commit-
ted the most atrocious act a Cheyenne could 
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commit, the killing of another Cheyenne. 
Blood spilled within the tribe polluted the 
Mahuts, the four sacred arrows the Creator 
gave to the Cheyenne people to mark them as 
distinct from other mortals and forever bind 
them to him.! As one of the four Old Man 
Chiefs of the tribe, Little Wolf understood 
that defiling the Mahuts disrupted the unity 
between the Cheyenne and their Creator, 
creating trouble for his people. Immediately 
sobered and embarrassed, and understand-
ing that custom demanded retribution from 
Starving Elk's kin, Little Wolf dropped his rifle 
and reportedly declared, "I am going up on that 
hill by the bend of the creek. If anybody wants 
me I'll be there."2 
Although disgraced and initially cast 
out by much of the tribe, the pull of Little 
Wolf remained strong, and within a year, 
eighty-six Cheyenne families followed Little 
Wolf to his self-imposed exile near Rosebud 
Creek.3 To most observers, this blind loyalty 
to a fallen leader required little explanation. 
After all, Little Wolf had recently led his 
people in a costly yet courageous escape from 
Indian Territory, fighting through the dead 
of winter back to the Northern Cheyenne's 
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ancestral Montana homeland, and in the 
process attained a cultlike status. Thankful 
to have survived their deadly encounters in 
the Northern Plains, these obedient followers 
appeared simply to cast their lot with their 
military and spiritual leader, following him to 
wherever his violent acts led. When this small 
community soon prospered to the point that 
just four years later President Chester Arthur 
declared a Northern Cheyenne Reservation 
in the specific area surrounding Little Wolf's 
exile, the amazing story of the resilient and 
defiant Northern Cheyenne seemed complete.4 
Little Wolf guided his people through the har-
rowing escape back to Montana, and his final 
act of violence dictated the specific location of 
their federally sanctioned home. 
This explanation for the ultimate location 
of the Northern Cheyenne Reservation fits well 
within the narrative of violence that too often 
dominates accounts of this and other nine-
teenth-century Plains Indian tribes. Typically 
framed as tales of heroic or bloodthirsty whites 
combating noble or savage Indians, popular 
understandings of current reservation locations 
are either a depressing tale of Indians being 
herded onto undesired wastelands or a romantic 
saga of perseverance and violence where Indian 
groups are ultimately awarded a small piece of 
their ancestral homeland as a token for past sac-
rifices.s The Northern Cheyenne historiography 
is as guilty as any other in perpetrating these 
tales of violence that overshadow other impor-
tant aspects of frontier life, most notably the 
many pragmatic adaptations Indians undertook 
in their search for subsistence and sovereignty. 
Inevitably fore grounding the improbable escape 
from Indian Territory to their Montana home-
land and concluding with Little Wolf's final act 
of violence, these Northern Cheyenne histories 
proudly explain that militant Indian defiance 
eventually produced a reservation where there 
was none, and then the tribe fought passionately 
to defend and expand this refuge by the dawn of 
the twentieth century.6 
As with most tidy narratives, however, the 
reality of the Northern Cheyenne is more 
complicated. More than blindly following a 
martial hero whose violent acts dictated the 
locale of their new home, those families that 
joined Little Wolf did so because the land upon 
which he settled offered greater opportunities 
for sustenance, and by extension, control over 
their lives. The sheltered and fertile river val-
leys surrounding Rosebud Creek not only sup-
ported ample game for traditional Cheyenne 
subsistence hunting, but more importantly 
to securing a reservation, provided an ideal 
setting for irrigated farming and ranching, 
practices the Cheyenne adopted with great 
success while imprisoned at Fort Keogh. There, 
under Little Wolf's pragmatic leadership, the 
Cheyenne learned the value of providing their 
own subsistence in ways acceptable to federal 
authorities, noting that the less they depended 
upon federal rations, the more daily freedom 
they had to continue indigenous traditions 
vital to their community. Understanding that 
subsistence and sovereignty were intimately 
entwined, the Northern Cheyenne selectively 
incorporated certain agricultural practices to 
retain control over their own existence'? 
In addition to maintaining this control, 
adopting Anglo subsistence practices that 
conformed to federal mandates and cultural 
expectations for "civilizing" western Indians 
also secured important federal allies, such as 
Fort Keogh commander and Cheyenne cham-
pion Colonel Nelson Miles. In fact, by the time 
Cheyenne families began leaking out of Fort 
Keogh after Little Wolf's violent act, Indian 
efforts to farm and ranch had so pleased federal 
officers that the military actually supported this 
otherwise illegal migration, supplying farming 
supplies and manpower to assist the burgeoning 
agricultural community. This federal support 
would continue through the settlement's early 
years when local whites protested-sometimes 
violently-the notion of Indians possessing the 
area's best land, and culminated in a successful 
petition for the reservation's establishment. In 
the end, the Northern Cheyenne's willingness 
to adopt Anglo agricultural practices-which 
they understood could provide subsistence, 
greater freedoms, and key federal allies-best 
explains the creation of the reservation. 
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To the Northern Cheyenne's white support-
ers, the 1884 reservation was a crucial step in 
the project to settle this "most fierce and war-
like tribe," circumscribing the Cheyenne in a 
tightly controlled spatial logic that segregated 
the tribe from the wild and chaotic frontier 
conditions so they could be managed to meet 
white expectations. Trusting that a systematic 
ordering of the reservation would enhance 
the Northern Cheyenne's safety, increase 
agricultural production, and bring important 
civilizing benefits, Cheyenne allies supported 
Superintendent John Tully's 1891 explanation 
that what the Indians really needed was the 
"boundering [sic] of lines on the East [of the 
reservation] ... and that all the whites be 
bought off and a wire fence be built all around 
the Reservation hog tight and cattle strong."s 
Clearly demarcated lines segregating the civi-
lizing Northern Cheyenne from the unplanned 
and chaotic frontier would ensure their safe 
progression to civilization.9 
As events played out, however, it became 
clear that the original reservation grant was 
insufficient to meet either Indian or white 
expectations. As more Northern Cheyenne 
returned to Montana, and the military enrolled 
them in the civilizing project on the tiny res-
ervation, land and resources became scarce, 
forcing some Indians to look off-reservation for 
subsistence. When a few Cheyenne began to 
prey upon the country's animal stock, includ-
ing both wildlife and white-owned cattle, area 
ranchers denied these were survival tactics and 
deplored them as evidence of the Indians' immu-
table savagery. Similar to the spatial logic used 
by Northern Cheyenne allies to confine Indians 
to the "orderly and productive" reservation, 
critics imposed temporal limits upon Northern 
Cheyenne actions, refusing to conceive of 
Indians as anything but primitive, nomadic sav-
ages incapable of progressing into civilization. 
Faced with perceived intractable hostiles in 
their midst, non-Indian ranchers then launched 
a passionate effort to remove the Northern 
Cheyenne from the region's prized bottom lands. 
During the reservation's early years, pre-
dictably violent encounters ensued between 
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the mobile and hungry Cheyenne and fearful 
ranchers protecting their livestock. While 
historians have seized upon these recurring 
episodes to justify the narrative of violence 
driving explanations for the 1900 expansion 
of the Northern Cheyenne Reservation, these 
encounters are understood best not as the prod-
uct of militant Indian defiance, but within the 
context of diverse groups struggling to possess 
pockets of highly desirable land in a region 
short on such attractive options. The result was 
a clash of mutually exclusive claims to the land, 
neither of which allowed room for the presence 
of the other in this contested space. Thus, 
even when the Northern Cheyenne seemed 
to accept white patterns of subsistence like 
farming and ranching, local whites engaged in 
those same practices refused to see Indians as 
capable of such civilized pursuits. Fortunately 
for the Northern Cheyenne, efforts to farm 
and ranch did transform federal perceptions of 
these Indians into a people capable of civiliza-
tion and deserving of a reservation. Federal 
allies consistently intervened on the Northern 
Cheyenne's behalf and ultimately expanded 
the reservation's boundaries and removed 
troublesome whites. Again, the Northern 
Cheyenne's ability to understand the changed 
conditions in the Northern Plains and adopt 
settled subsistence practices that met federal 
expectations resulted in the unlikely construc-
tion of an enlarged and exclusive reservation. 
A HOME OF THEIR OWN: EARLY NORTHERN 
CHEYENNE AGRICULTURAL EFFORTS 
Most histories of the Northern Cheyenne 
provide the infamous 1876 Battle of Little 
Bighorn as the high-water mark of tribal resis-
tance in the Northern Plains. From this heroic 
peak, the saga of the Northern Cheyenne typi-
cally devolves into a tale of a fragmented tribe 
being relentlessly pursued by an embarrassed 
and angered federal military. Ultimately, this 
reinvigorated military force would pressure 
the Northern Cheyenne into surrender, result-
ing in the tribe's removal to Indian Territory. 
There, in an unfamiliar land plagued by 
© 2012 Center for Great Plains Studies, University of Nebraska-Lincoln 
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insufficient rations, inhospitable hosts, and 
virulent diseases, two Northern Cheyenne 
leaders-Dull Knife and Little Wolf-would 
make the fateful decision to lead approximately 
300 Cheyenne out of Indian Territory and 
back to Montana. As the story goes, this group 
fought a heroic, rearguard battle through the 
dead of winter back to Montana, eliciting the 
respect, sympathy, and outright fear of federal 
authorities, who ultimately chose the path of 
least resistance and granted the tribe a small 
reservation in a sparsely populated region. In 
this traditional telling, only militant resistance 
and the loss of Cheyenne blood could eventu-
ally produce a home of their own.1° 
While these colorful and important his-
tories do good work in reversing the more 
typical declension narrative of the helpless 
and doomed Indian tribe, they fail to provide a 
convincing explanation for how the Northern 
Cheyenne came to secure this home of their 
own without the benefit of a federal treaty 
providing one. Certainly, armed resistance 
played a key role in delivering particular groups 
of Northern Cheyenne back to Montana from 
their exile in Indian Territory, but as Christina 
Berndt points out, these groups arrived in the 
Powder River Basin in the spring of 1879, a full 
five years before the reservation's establish-
ment. Berndt shows there is little evidence 
indicating that the tragic events surrounding 
Dull Knife and Little Wolf's escape from Indian 
Territory influenced federal officials to look 
favorably on the Northern Cheyenne's situa-
tion.H If anything, federal officials were more 
divided over what to do with the Northern 
Cheyenne after their return to Montana, con-
templating options ranging from removal back 
to Indian Territory to placing the Northern 
Cheyenne on the nearby Crow or Sioux res-
ervations. At the very least, it is clear that 
violence alone cannot explain why the federal 
government would exert so much energy to 
defeat a recalcitrant tribe in 1877 and yet cave 
to these same methods seven years later and 
award a reservation. There is more to this story. 
Foremost among the complicating fac-
tors that resulted in a Northern Cheyenne 
Reservation was the Indians' willingness to 
engage in the "civilized" pursuits of settled 
ranching and agriculture.12 Almost imme-
diately upon their return to Montana, the 
Northern Cheyenne began raising crops and 
cattle in an attempt to provide subsistence and 
avoid further confrontations. The flight from 
Indian Territory had taken a terrible toll on 
the tribe, delivering barely half its original par-
ticipants back to their Montana homeland in 
the spring of 1879. Beyond the cost in human 
lives, however, this trek clearly revealed to 
the Northern Cheyenne the changed circum-
stances in the Northern Plains and cemented 
their desire for a settled existence. Harassed 
at each point along their journey, there was 
no part of that country where the tribe could 
now live undisturbed. Little Wolf clearly 
recognized this, and upon entry to Montana, 
he quickly sought to surrender to Lieutenant 
William Philo Clark, an officer he had pre-
viously scouted with and grown to respect. 
Finding Clark accompanied by his chief scout, 
the Northern Cheyenne Two Moons, who had 
surrendered shortly after the Battle of Little 
Bighorn, Little Wolf explained his travails in 
the south and then noted his few remaining 
people only "wanted a little ground where we 
could live." Thanking Clark for his willingness 
to "talk before fighting," Little Wolf seemed 
to grasp the enormity of this final surrender, 
declaring in poetic terms, "[I]r looks as though 
the wind, which has made our hearts flutter 
for so long, would now go down."13 Coming to 
terms with these changed circumstances, Little 
Wolf and his people determined to lead a new, 
settled life in their old, reclaimed home. 
Convinced of the Northern Cheyenne's 
resolve to settle in Montana, Clark lobbied 
agains~another costly removal. Writing to his 
superiors that spring, Clark argued, 
[The Northern Cheyenne] are weary with 
constant fighting and watching. They 
want peace, rest, and a home somewhere 
in this country where they were born and 
reared. . . . Should they be ordered back, 
they may seek escape by throwing them-
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selves against the bullets and bayonets of 
the soldiers, or by suicide. If allowed to stay 
they would be among our strongest, best and 
bravest allies.14 
Ultimately, his superiors agreed. Seeing the 
potential utility of enrolling more Cheyenne 
scouts in their recurring hostilities with the 
Sioux, federal officials allowed the Northern 
Cheyenne to stay at Fort Keogh as prisoners of 
war.15 For their part, the Northern Cheyenne 
understood what was required of them to 
remain in Montana. Numbering close to 400 
with the unification of Two Moons' and Little 
Wolf's bands, these Indians needed to demon-
strate loyalty to the United States and a fervent 
desire to pursue a settled agricultural existence. 
As to the first demand, Little Wolf himself 
enlisted as a "sergeant" in the federal army's 
continued campaign along the Canadian 
border against Sitting Bull's restless Sioux. In 
addition to his military service, Little Wolf 
further strengthened his relationship with 
Lieutenant Clark, as the two spent long hours 
together collaborating on a book on Indian 
sign language. The chief's desire to remain 
at peace was so strong that when news came 
that several of his former warriors had killed 
a soldier, Little Wolf himself called for justice. 
Noting that local laws called for swift punish-
ment, Little Wolf exclaimed, "[H]ang them or 
imprison them for life. I never want to see their 
faces again. They knew I had made peace with 
you and they killed your soldiers."16 Clearly, 
the chief did not intend to upset the tenuous 
relation between his people and the federal 
military. 
In addition to cultivating relationships, 
the Northern Cheyenne also began cultivat-
ing land and cattle around Fort Keogh. In his 
1879 annual report, Colonel Nelson Miles, 
founder and commander of Fort Keogh, was 
so pleased by Northern Cheyenne efforts to 
raise cattle and crops that he felt compelled "to 
invite especial attention to the Indians that 
remain[ed] at Fort Keogh," explaining how 
the Northern Cheyenne managed to support 
themselves "without annuities or appropria-
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tions of Congress" and bragged that "the funds 
realized from the sale of ponies surrendered by 
[the Northern Cheyenne] have given them a 
good herd of domestic cattle, and by their own 
industry they have cultivated an extensive 
field, and will this season raise an abundance 
of vegetables, sufficient to last them during the 
winter and until next summer.'>17 
Months later, testifying to the Senate 
select committee investigating the Northern 
Cheyenne removal to and flight from Indian 
Territory, Miles explained that the Indian 
cattle herd had been divided between the 
Cheyenne families and branded accordingly, 
and that individual sections of land sur-
rounding Fort Keogh had been allotted to 
Indian families for cultivation.18 According 
to Private George Yoakam, the "farmer boy 
from Illinois" charged with monitoring the 
Northern Cheyenne's agricultural efforts, 
the tribe had cultivated thirty-eight acres by 
the end of 1879.19 These Northern Cheyenne 
actions had earned Miles's trust and, in his 
eyes, the right to remain in their homeland. 
Ironically, the relative prosperity of the 
Northern Cheyenne at Fort Keogh generated 
a new set of concerns for the tribe. Technically 
still considered prisoners of war, a label that 
allowed Colonel Miles to keep them at the fort 
rather than transferred to their assigned reserva-
tions elsewhere, their presence and prosperity 
at Keogh put a strain on local resources. Miles 
compounded this problem in late 1879 when he 
personally lobbied for the transfer to Fort Keogh 
of Dull Knife and the remaining survivors from 
the Northern Cheyenne's flight from Indian 
Territory.20 Though the reunification of Lone 
Wolf and Dull Knife's people must have gener-
ated much joy, land was becoming scarce, and 
it was clear that the area's resources could not 
support the growing Indian population. Thus, 
beginning in the spring of 1880, Miles resorted 
to allowing groups of Cheyenne to leave the 
fort to hunt for game near the Tongue River, a 
broken country of timber and grassland crossed 
by multiple creeks and rivers that supported 
ample wildlife. Convinced of the Northern 
Cheyenne's loyalty, Miles saw these intermit-
© 2012 Center for Great Plains Studies, University of Nebraska-Lincoln 
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tent hunting parties as the perfect outlet to Fort 
Keogh's overcrowding problem. 
What began as temporary hunting excur-
sions, however, began to take on a permanent 
nature after Little Wolf's murder of Starving 
Elk in December 1880. Ashamed and disgraced 
by his actions, Little Wolf moved his large 
family away from the fort to settle in the area 
of Rosebud Creek, south of Keogh and west of 
the Tongue River. Many Northern Cheyenne 
soon followed to take advantage of that coun-
try's relatively abundant resources, and Miles's 
initial, tacit approval of this informal method 
for alleviating Fort Keogh's overcrowding even-
tually morphed into an official endorsement. In 
the spring of 1882, the Fort Keogh commander 
appointed Captain E. P. Ewers, leader of the 
fort's Indian scouts, to oversee the settlement of 
Two Moons' and Dull Knife's bands along the 
same area as Little Wolf's camp near Rosebud 
Creek. Ewers, in turn, settled yet another 
Northern Cheyenne group on the Tongue 
River under the watch of George Yoakam, the 
Illinois private who had directed Indian farm-
ing at Fort Keogh.2l Adapting to the practical 
necessities of life along the western frontier, 
the Cheyenne and the federal military forged 
a pragmatic solution that placed these Indians 
back in their ancestral home and outside the 
immediate purview of the soldiers at Fort 
Keogh. 
Reporting on the settlements later that 
fall, Ewers could barely conceal his pride. The 
Cheyenne had constructed numerous framed 
cabins and spaced them to allow each family 
to claim the full homestead allotment of 160 
acres. Their cattle herd had grown to 170 head, 
and while the amount of ground under cul-
tivation disappointed Ewers, he excused this 
setback due to the summer's drought, conclud-
ing, "I believe that all of these Indians will do 
better next year, as they are very anxious to 
live like white men and remain in this coun-
try."zz Ewers's immediate superior, Lieutenant 
Colonel Whistler, also seemed pleased with 
the Indians' progress. Passing Ewers's report on 
to his superiors and requesting more farming 
equipment from the Indian Office, Whistler 
noted, "[T]hese Indians have been self-sustain-
ing for the past three years and are gradually 
becoming more civilized-many beginning 
to speak English."23 While civilian Indian 
officials in Washington never sanctioned these 
settlements-and in fact, Colonel Miles had 
no legal authority to settle Indians off military 
or Indian reservations-the pragmatic solution 
was producing successful early returns. 
It would be a mistake, however, to view 
the Northern Cheyenne's willingness to 
settle, farm, and ranch as an acquiescence 
to adopt wholeheartedly the subsistence pat-
terns, social organization, and cultural values 
of a conquering foe. In fact, the Northern 
Cheyenne only incorporated certain aspects 
of the Euro-American "social-cultural-subsis-
tence package" into their lifeways, limiting 
their adaptation to those economic practices 
that afforded the greatest control over their 
own lives. This selective incorporation pro-
vided the Northern Cheyenne with multiple 
options for obtaining the material base neces-
sary for self-sufficiency and allowed them to 
forgo federal rations for the first five years of 
their return to Montana. 24 Acknowledging 
the success of these economic adaptations, 
Captain Ewers remarked that the Northern 
Cheyenne "fed and clothed themselves, 
bought their wagons and harness [sic], built 
and furnished their houses, [all] with money 
received from the sale of buffalo robes, pro-
duce and ponies and what was earned by 
work and scouting."25 As Ewers's mention 
of buffalo robes makes clear, however, while 
farming, ranching, and settled wage work con-
tributed to Northern Cheyenne subsistence, 
the Cheyenne did not completely relinquish 
more traditional subsistence practices, such as 
hunting, to supplement their diet and income. 
Moreover, the economic self-sufficiency gar-
nered by this mixed economy afforded the 
Northern Cheyenne the freedom to continue 
social practices and cultural ceremonies that 
sustained their distinctive community, most 
importantly the frequent sojourns across the 
Plains that were crucial to maintaining kin-
ship ties. As Christina Berndt explains, 
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By adopting some of the institutions of 
the nation-state such as homesteading, they 
had secured land in the heart of the home-
land, freedom to hunt and continue ceremo-
nies, and the ability to maintain their own 
social life and kin ties with family far away. 
They also managed to live outside the con-
stant surveillance of the United States gov-
ernment. Homesteading by the Northern 
Cheyenne surely looked to the government 
as if these Plains peoples had given up their 
tribal life, when in fact they had used an 
institution the federal government provided 
to maintain tribal life by maintaining land, 
mobility and kin ties.26 
Again, the pragmatic solution constructed 
within altered circumstances in the Northern 
Plains brought important benefits to both 
the federal government and the Northern 
Cheyenne. While neither side completely 
understood the other's perception of this 
arrangement, each group's needs were being 
met in a peaceful manner. 
A LAND NOT THEIR OWN: WHITE 
CONFLICT AND FEDERAL INTERVENTION 
This mutually beneficial arrangement 
between the federal military and the Northern 
Cheyenne did not, however, satisfy all parties 
in the region. As it turns out, the Northern 
Cheyenne were reclaiming the Tongue River 
and Rosebud Creek valleys at the same time 
that powerful ranching interests set their sights 
on these areas. In 1881, the Northern Pacific 
Railroad extended its western terminus to 
Miles City, the town founded in 1877 to serve 
the needs of Fort Keogh and named after its 
commander. With the arrival of the railroad, 
local residents worked to make their town the 
premier point of embarkation for eastbound 
Montana and Wyoming cattle. City officials 
constructed extensive stockyards and boosters 
advertised the region's lush grasses and ample 
water supplies. As one writer for the local 
Yellowstone Journal summed it up, "Everything 
in consideration ... there is no country near us 
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that presents so many inducements to settlers 
as the Tongue River valley."27 
Ranchers in the region took heed, and by 
the summer of 1882 they were driving large 
herds up the Tongue River Valley toward Miles 
City, right through the nascent Northern 
Cheyenne communities. These cattle drives 
were part and parcel of the heyday of the open 
range in the Northern Plains. By virtue of the 
1868 Fort Laramie Treaty, which recognized 
several tribes' exclusive rights to northeastern 
Wyoming and eastern Montana, vast spaces 
of this region had been (ostensibly) closed to 
white ranching. The 1870s Indian wars, how-
ever, reshuffled the regional map, creating a 
potential bonanza for ranchers well positioned 
to take advantage of this recently opened land. 
This incentive, combined with the incessant 
western push of the railroads, created a huge 
boom in large-scale ranching in Montana and 
Wyoming during the early 1880s. Between 
1880 and 1883, for instance, eastern Montana 
witnessed the complete depletion of its buffalo 
herd and its replacement with over 600,000 
head of cattle. In 1883 alone, over twenty 
cattle companies with more than 12 million 
dollars in capital registered to conduct ranching 
operations in Wyoming.2S Clearly, the plans laid 
for this region were no small design. The pres-
ence of approximately 700 Cheyenne along the 
region's primary cattle thoroughfare was not just 
an annoying nuisance. It constituted a major 
obstacle that had to be eliminated. 
In the fall of 1882, area ranchers took the 
first step to remove these human impediments. 
Led by rancher Jesse Haston, they bypassed 
federal authorities at Fort Keogh, whom they 
perceived as sympathetic to the Indians, and 
wrote directly to the Commissioner of Indian 
Affairs, Hiram Price, complaining of lost cattle. 
Haston claimed more than 50,000 head of cattle 
grazed in the vicinity south of Miles City, that 
there was no game available for hunting, and 
yet somehow the area supported 700 Cheyenne. 
The only logical conclusion, he pressed, was that 
Indians were killing white-owned cattle.29 The 
Wyoming Stock Growers Association lodged 
similar, and perhaps coordinated, complaints 
© 2012 Center for Great Plains Studies, University of Nebraska-Lincoln 
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to their territorial delegation around the same 
time.30 The solution offered by both parties was 
the outright removal of the Indians from the 
Tongue River Valley. 
These efforts to convince federal officials 
to remove the Northern Cheyenne in favor 
of more pressing economic concerns triggered 
a tense, twenty-year debate about the proper 
use of the region's resources. When George 
Yoakam responded with a fiery retort defend-
ing the Cheyenne and claiming the ranchers' 
allegations amounted to nothing more than 
"a scheme invented by a few stockmen to rob 
these innocent Indians," Commissioner Price 
sent a special agent to investigate the compet-
ing claims.3l Reporting back in the spring of 
1883, special agent George Milburn confirmed 
Yoakam's defense, stating that the Indians "are 
certainly peaceable, and my cattle depredation 
investigation failed to elicit from the cattle men 
who made complaint against these Indians any 
positive evidence of malicious depredation any-
where." Moreover, Milburn concluded that suf-
ficient game still existed to partially support the 
Indian settlements, evidenced by oral reports 
as well as the presence of thousands of buffalo 
hides and animal skins found among the Indians 
and at various trading posts in the region.32 
Milburn's report stopped short, however, 
of offering universal praise. He noted large 
discrepancies between the good health of the 
Northern Cheyenne settlements on Rosebud 
Creek-which included Little Wolf's, Dull 
Knife's, and Two Moons' bands-and the 
desperate conditions facing the Tongue River 
settlements overseen by Private Yoakam, which 
were located directly in the path of the cattle 
drives. Though Milburn blamed these discrep-
ancies on Yoakam's poor leadership, claiming 
the private to be a "monomaniac on Indian 
rights" and an instigator of Indian-white 
conflict, he could barely cloak his larger inten-
tions.33 Arguing the area's inherent value as 
rangeland and noting the availability of farm-
land west of the Tongue River valley, Milburn 
concluded that the first order of business must 
be the removal of all Indians without proper 
homestead claims in the Tongue River area to 
a reservation where they could farm peaceably, 
away from white threats.34 Of course, the fact 
that George Milburn soon left military service 
to spearhead local ranchers' efforts to effect 
this removal sheds much light on his motiva-
tions for suggesting the policy.35 
Despite Milburn's suspect motivations, the 
federal agent was attuned to the potential for 
racial conflict in the area. Soon after his report 
was filed, violence erupted between ranchers 
and several Northern Cheyenne, resulting in 
the shooting of two Indians and the burning 
of a white-owned ranch. While later investi-
gations revealed non-Indians provoked these 
altercations, local reports focused on Northern 
Cheyenne actions and the government's impru-
dent decision to settle wild Indians in land 
suited best for white ranching. Influenced by 
these misleading accounts, the incidents served 
to galvanize a significant portion of the local 
population against the Indians' presence and 
produced a petition for their removal, submitted 
to Commissioner Price in the summer of 1884. 
Ordered to investigate the claims included 
in this petition, the new Indian inspector M. 
R. Barr once again found most allegations 
baseless. Perhaps more importantly, Barr was 
able to disaggregate the local white popula-
tion into groups supporting Indian removal, 
those opposed, and those simply indifferent to 
the Northern Cheyenne's presence. His report 
explained that large-scale ranching interests 
drove opposition to the Northern Cheyenne in 
order to maintain the open range, noting" [the 
cattlemen] are at all times actively involved in 
molding public sentiment in favor of that inter-
est." Barr concluded that other area whites who 
did not share these economic interests, includ-
ing homesteading farmers and merchants who 
traded with the Northern Cheyenne, generally 
accepted the Indians' presence and saw them as 
deserving neighbors.36 
Even noting these important distinctions, 
Barr still believed that removal of the Northern 
Cheyenne to more fertile areas was the best 
solution for peace in the area, but Indian 
resolve to remain in the region made this 
plan implausible. As Two Moons explained to 
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Barr, the Indians knew that ranchers falsely 
accused them of killing cattle and had hoped 
to provoke open conflict in order to effect their 
removal. Nonetheless, Two Moons reminded 
the inspector that his people remained peace-
ful, were attempting to farm and ranch, and 
thus deserved to stay. As the chief pointed out, 
"We came here to make our permanent homes 
and it is our best interest to behave ourselves 
well. If we were roving about we could then 
take our chances, but not now when we are per-
manently settled."37 It was a logical argument. 
Faced with conflicting and intransigent 
interests, Barr ultimately recommended a 
small reservation centered around Little Wolf's 
original settlement on Rosebud Creek, where 
the land was more suitable to farming and 
farther removed from white cattle operations 
in the Tongue River Valley. Other federal 
officials soon supported this seemingly prag-
matic compromise and ultimately convinced 
Commissioner Price that this small reserve rep-
resented the best of several imperfect options.38 
On November 26, 1884, President Chester 
Arthur accepted Commissioner Price's recom-
mendation and issued an executive order creat-
ing the Northern Cheyenne Reservation. Less 
than ten years after the Battle of Little Bighorn 
and the removal of Northern Cheyenne from 
southeastern Montana, the tribe gained official 
recognition of their right to exist within their 
ancestral homeland. 
A RESERVATION OF tHEIR OWN: 
CONTINUED WHITE CONFLICT AND 
RESERVATION EXTENSION 
While the importance of the official estab-
lishment of a Northern Cheyenne reservation 
should not be discounted, this act did little 
to resolve many of the Indians' immediately 
pressing concerns. The majority still eked out 
a meager existence in a difficult country that 
was becoming increasingly occupied by those 
whose interests ran counter to their own. In 
theory, the creation of the reservation prom-
ised to relax some of these constricting pres-
sures, but in practice the Northern Cheyenne 
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continued to struggle with an unfamiliar 
subsistence model, hampered by a limited land 
base. Moreover, multiple external factors 
worked against the development of a self-sus-
taining reservation. The first of these was par-
tially a function of the official act establishing 
the reservation, as this action served notice to 
all Northern Cheyenne that a formal sanctuary 
had been created in their ancestral homeland, 
and thus inferred their right to return. Before 
long, military officials faced a flood of Northern 
Cheyenne hoping to resettle, which increased 
pressures on the tiny reservation's already 
stressed resources.39 
Unfortunately for the Northern Cheyenne, 
more Indians were arriving at the newly cre-
ated reservation at the same time that material 
conditions on the tiny reserve were deteriorat-
ing. The Northern Cheyenne's first permanent 
Indian agent, R. L. Upshaw, arrived in 1886 just 
in time to report on the "driest summer known 
in this region for the past ten years." These con-
ditions undoubtedly contributed to the massive 
wildfires that devastated the reservation that 
year, destroying what was left of those crops 
not already decimated by the arrival of the 
"potato-bug."4o The brutal 1886-87 winter then 
followed, which Upshaw described as "one of 
the most severe experienced in this country for 
years" and noted the Indians were lucky to lose 
only 10 percent of their small cattle herd.4! This 
combination of unfortunate climatic events 
led the new agent to conclude solemnly, "The 
agricultural products will make no appreciable 
addition to the food supply, and these Indians, 
having no poultry, no hogs, sheep, or cattle, 
and the game having been swept beyond their 
reach, are left entirely dependent on the charity 
of the Government for every particle of good 
that they consume.'>42 The resourceful tribe that 
federal officials had so proudly upheld for their 
self-sufficiency just a few years earlier had been 
reduced by a disastrous set of circumstances to 
dependent government wards (See Fig. 1). 
To make matters worse, the Northern 
Cheyenne's dependence on government largesse 
increased at the same time federal officials 
were reducing their financial commitment to 
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FIG. 1. "Cheyenne Chief Two Moons' Lodge," L.A. Huffman, c. 1886. Courtesy of Montana Historical Society 
Research Center, Archives. 
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them. In fact, while President Arthur created 
an official Northern Cheyenne Reservation in 
1884, Congress included no provisions in the 
federal budget for its maintenance. Instead, 
the only appropriation made for the Northern 
Cheyenne came by virtue of previous treaty 
agreements, and these funds were committed 
to those Cheyenne remaining on the Wind 
River Reservation in Wyoming Territory. Even 
when Congress passed last-minute measures to 
divert emergency provisions to the Montana 
Northern Cheyenne and later enacted leg-
islation to redistribute treaty funds between 
all Northern Cheyenne groups on a pro rata 
basis, the overall expenditures budgeted for 
the tribe still decreased during the mid-1880s. 
The situation became so dire that by 1885 
the new Commissioner of Indian Affairs, J. 
D. C. Atkins, wrote to President Cleveland 
specifically requesting additional funds for 
the Northern Cheyenne in order "to meet the 
pressing emergency and to avoid distress, suffer-
ing and death among these Indians from star-
vation and exposure to the winter weather."43 
Atkins's words echoed those of his predecessor, 
Hiram Price, who complained the previous 
year that the paltry sum Congress intended to 
split between the Northern Cheyenne groups 
was insufficient: "I have no doubt," Price com-
plained, "that when the [budgeted funds] for 
food and clothing is divided between those in 
Wyoming and on the Tongue River, neither of 
these bands will have sufficient to prevent star-
vation or depredation."44 Events would soon 
confirm these ominous warnings. 
The final and perhaps most crucial factor 
working against the Northern Cheyenne's 
ability to develop a sustainable and peaceful 
existence along Rosebud Creek was the con-
tinued presence of whites on the reservation. 
By the time of the reservation's 1884 establish-
ment, many white settlers had already staked 
homestead claims in the area around Rosebud 
Creek.45 These legal claims provided ground 
for area ranchers to argue against the reserva-
tion's establishment, claiming administration 
would be too cumbersome and the potential 
for conflict too high.46 Whether white ranch-
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ers were truly concerned about administrative 
difficulties is debatable, but what is not is the 
fact that these early settlers occupied much 
of the reservation's best land. Special agent 
Bannister, who arrived on the reservation in 
early 1885 to investigate the suitability of the 
recently established boundaries, confirmed 
that "[a]11 the best agricultural land upon 
the Reservation was taken up by white men 
before the Reservation was created." Bannister 
deemed this situation so dire that he recom-
mended the president rescind the executive 
order establishing the reserve, not because he 
opposed a reservation for the Cheyenne, but 
because he believed the remaining land could 
not sustain the Indian population.47 
Bannister's recommendation, however, 
went unheeded, setting the stage for yet more 
tension between the Northern Cheyenne and 
white ranchers. While successful white settlers 
cultivated land and grazed cattle and sheep, 
the Northern Cheyenne experienced depleting 
rations and mounting hunger. The command-
ing officer at nearby Fort Custer confirmed the 
dangerous potential for conflict in the fall of 
1886, explaining, "The country surrounding 
the Tongue River Agency is all filled up with 
herds of cattle and sheep and in [the Northern 
Cheyenne's] starving condition the temptation 
to kill beeves and sheep is strong."48 Other 
military officials echoed the warning, includ-
ing a Major Snyder who reported from Fort 
Keogh that "with large herds of fat, sleek cattle 
of white men grazing on almost every hill of the 
Tongue River Reservation, as trespassers, and 
Indian women and children crying for food, but 
one result will follow: some of the cattle will 
go to supply the wants of the Indians."49 Two 
Moons himself even traveled to Fort Keogh in 
November 1886 to complain of the destruction 
caused by the whites' vast herds. He explained 
that cattlemen on the reservation drove their 
stock through the Indians' small but vital 
gardens, forcing the tribe to kill the remain-
der of their own cattle to keep from starving 
(See Fig. 2). "So long as cattlemen are allowed 
to range cattle on the reservation," the chief 
warned, "there will be trouble."so 
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FIG. 2. "Beef Issues, Northern Cheyenne," Christian Barthelmess, c. 1889. Courtesy of Denver Public 
Library, Digital Collections. 
Off the reserve, the potential for conflict was 
no better. The original reservation boundaries 
excluded those Northern Cheyenne settle-
ments along the Tongue River because, among 
other reasons, federal agents determined that 
this major cattle thoroughfare constituted a 
poor spot for an Indian reservation devoted to 
land cultivation. As federal officials discovered 
the inadequacy of the original reserve for sup-
plying the needs of an increasing Northern 
Cheyenne population, they encouraged the 
Tongue River Indians to file homestead claims 
under the 1875 Indian Homestead Law, which 
many did.51 Unfortunately, because the region 
had not yet been formally surveyed, this 
approach brought its own set of problems. 
Well-intentioned officials like George Yoakam 
assisted Indians in filing homestead claims, but 
the result was confusing and overlapping land 
claims, providing yet another source for poten-
tial conflict with whites. 
Sensing the precarious situation created 
by these competing claims, the Secretary 
of Interior ordered the region's first compre-
hensive survey in the summer of 1886 and 
requested that the General Land Office pro-
hibit white homestead entries until the survey 
was completed and Indian homesteads properly 
allocated.52 Suspicious white ranchers inter-
preted this land freeze as a de facto reservation 
extension, and began colluding with the local 
land agent to frustrate federal intentions by 
continuing to file land claims. Because the 
reservation boundaries in this unsurveyed 
region were unclear, many of these new white 
claims impinged on the reservation itself, 
adding further fire to the country's strained 
relations. Local whites even submitted a peti-
tion to President Benjamin Harrison demand-
ing the reservation be thrown open to public 
homesteading, claiming "the experiment ... of 
sandwiching whites and Indians together has 
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long since proved abortive, and should ... be 
ended without further delay."53 Tensions ran so 
high that in the spring of 1890 the federal army 
established Camp Merritt on the reservation 
itself to ensure the peace. 54 
Despite the federal government's best efforts, 
this fragile order would not hold. Less than 
a month after Camp Merritt's establishment, 
local officials discovered the slain body of a 
white rancher next to a rotting cattle carcass. 
Immediately, rumors circulated that Indians 
had killed the rancher after he stumbled upon 
their illegal slaying of white-owned cattle. 
The Yellowstone Journal, the unequivocal 
mouthpiece of ranching interests, whipped 
the countryside into a frenzy, reporting that 
half-starved Indians were "armed to the teeth 
and bounteously supplied with ammunition," 
and warning that "[ilf the government does 
not move in this matter it is not improbable 
that the stockmen and cowboys will."55 Indian 
agent James Cooper confirmed that "[r]umors 
of a cowboy invasion were rampant, as was also 
the report that the Cheyenne had gone on the 
war path. Both Indians and whites were equally 
alarmed lest one or the other would precipitate 
a fight."56 Tensions increased further at the end 
of the summer when those Cheyenne arrested 
for the rancher's murder were released for a lack 
of evidence. That same week, another body was 
found murdered on the reservation. This time, 
the victim was a fifteen-year-old boy, and again, 
accusations flew that Indians had silenced the 
young man after he stumbled upon the butcher-
ing of white-owned cattle. Reporting on both 
the release of the suspected killers and the news 
of yet another death, the Yellowstone Journal 
surmised: 
The [release of the suspects] was not 
unexpected, but the knowledge that justice 
was probably to fail awakened in the minds 
of the settlers who live among these mur-
dering savages the self-reliant American 
feelings that if the law couldn't protect 
them they could and would protect them-
selves, and that the killing of another white 
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would be the signal for the inauguration of a 
bloody war of retaliationY 
Before white ranchers could dole out vigi-
lante justice, however, the Northern Cheyenne 
punished their own. In what the local press 
described dramatically as "blood atonement," 
the Cheyenne Indian police led a contingent 
of soldiers to arrest the boy's killers, two young 
Cheyenne named Head Chief and Young 
Mule.58 After a short parlay between Cheyenne 
leaders and the confessed killers, Two Moons 
reported that the perpetrators steadfastly 
affirmed "they will not be taken alive and if 
we failed in our barter for them their message 
to the agent was 'select the place for meeting 
and we will come to die in your sight.",59 With 
the fury of local whites at a fever pitch, there 
was little hope for a bargain. Federal troops, 
accompanied by twenty deputized Cheyenne, 
organized quickly to make the arrest. Holding 
firm to their promise, however, the two young 
Cheyenne met the arresting force in full war 
paint, charged through the assembled lines 
firing their weapons, and were eventually 
struck down by a combined volley of bullets. 
Though remarkable for its theatrics, this par-
ticular conflict between Northern Cheyenne 
and whites in the Tongue River valley ended 
like many others, with the death of two more 
Indians. 
In reporting on these greatly celebrated 
deaths, local whites continued to imbue the 
Cheyenne with romantic images of savagery 
that reconfirmed their beliefs that Indians were 
incapable of sharing their landscape. While a 
few accounts mentioned in passing the valu-
able assistance of the Indian police or noted 
the fact that the majority of the "tribe seem[ed] 
anxious to have the murderers arrested and 
punished," most reports focused on the dead 
Indians' gallant yet irrational suicidal charge.6o 
The Yellowstone Journal gushed, "[T]here has 
been few more romantic episodes in Indian 
annals than the killing of the two Cheyenne 
murderers" and that "the audacity displayed 
in this desperate attack upon two troops of 
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cavalry was probably never surpassed in the 
records of Indian bravery.,,61 The same paper 
also reminded its readers that "all [the dead 
Indians] wanted was a chance to fight and if 
possible kill some more white men before they 
were killed."62 Likewise, the Billings Gazette 
emphasized the scary precedent of defiance 
this episode reflected, commenting that "[the 
Indians'] object in doing so now seems to be 
to provoke a fight.,,63 Editorial claims such as 
these effectively accomplished two tasks: they 
permanently located Indian behavior in a past 
time of nomadic savagery and warned that such 
immutable characteristics would produce more 
bloodshed. Combined, these dual messages left 
readers with little flexibility in conceiving of 
ways to resolve the ongoing problems between 
the impoverished Northern Cheyenne and 
ambitious white ranchers. Again, the only solu-
tion appeared to be the complete removal of 
Indians from the region. 
In the midst of this fresh round of violence, 
Congress commissioned a special committee 
to investigate conditions in the Tongue River 
valley and propose those alternative solutions 
that white ranchers seemed incapable of produc-
ing. Led by General Nelson Miles, the Northern 
Cheyenne's old protector in the region, this 
"Northern Cheyenne Commission" blamed the 
recent incidents on deplorable reservation con-
ditions that forced the Indians to hunt white-
owned cattle for survival. Far from offering a 
holistic solution to the subsistence problems of 
the Northern Cheyenne or squelching white 
desires for additional ranchland, however, Miles 
focused on Northern Cheyenne dissatisfaction 
with the slow pace of tribal reunification, espe-
cially the federal government's refusal to reunite 
those Northern Cheyenne still located at the 
Sioux's Pine Ridge Agency with those on the 
reservation. Preoccupied by this concern, the 
Commission recommended only the immedi-
ate removal of all Pine Ridge Cheyenne to Fort 
Keogh, where they could be observed until 
some later date when they were deemed fit to be 
located on the reservation.64 
This shortsighted and limited plan pleased 
no one in the region. The proposed increase in 
Indian population to the region incensed white 
settlers, while the denial of full reunification 
on the reservation also upset the Northern 
Cheyenne. The new Northern Cheyenne 
agent, John Tully, communicated that Miles's 
report so "unsettled the Indians and shook 
their faith in the Great Father in Washington" 
that Tully was forced to take it upon himself 
to offer yet another solution. The agent argued 
that in order to meet the government's express 
goals of consolidating all Northern Cheyenne 
on one reservation and allocating to each 
family the 160 acres necessary to pursue settled 
ranching or agriculture, "it will be absolutely 
necessary to extend the boundary lines" east to 
the Tongue River.65 For the first time, a federal 
agent proposed the specific reservation bound-
aries that would later become law. Punctuated 
by his suggestion to fence the boundaries of the 
new reservation "hog tight and cattle strong," 
Tully also articulated the spatial logic of seg-
regating the Northern Cheyenne from local 
whites so as to manage their progression into 
civilization.66 
As opposed to previous pleas from Northern 
Cheyenne allies, Tully's novel solution of 
expanding the reservation boundaries and 
removing troublesome whites soon found 
ardent support from those within the federal 
bureaucracy with the power to effect this 
result. In 1892, Congress established the Sioux 
Commission, similar to Miles's Northern 
Cheyenne Commission, to report on condi-
tions and propose solutions for several Sioux 
reservations in the wake of the Ghost Dance 
movement. Since the Northern Cheyenne 
retained treaty rights to the Pine Ridge 
Reservation, the Commission was forced to 
weigh-in on the Northern Cheyenne situation, 
and the Commission ultimately made the case 
for a reservation extension even more emphati-
cally than Tully. First dismissing any claims of 
mass Indian depredations as unfounded and 
based solely on the actions of a few desperate 
Indians, the Sioux Commission took advan-
tage of the recently completed reservation 
survey to provide details on the extent of white 
trespassers, as well as bona fide homesteaders. 
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Finding the removal of these elements much 
more acceptable than the "palpable injustice" 
of yet another Northern Cheyenne transfer, 
the Sioux Commission concluded, 
If treated with impartial justice, the 
Cheyennes are tractable and will readily 
respond to civilizing influences. They have 
raised crops in goodly portions. They are 
now cutting hay in large quantities [See 
Figs. 3-6]. They are faithful in service and 
desire to be law-abiding. Whatever fric-
tion exists between them and neighboring 
white settlers will be readily removed if the 
laws now existing are fully and impartially 
enforced against trespassers, irrespective of 
race.67 
Both the Secretary of Interior and the Commis-
sioner of Indian Affairs readily endorsed the 
Sioux Commission's report, and Commissioner 
Morgan quickly submitted to Congress a pro-
posed bill to effect its recommendations.68 
Finally, the Northern Cheyenne had secured 
important allies in influential positions within 
the federal bureaucracy. 
Government bureaucracy being what it 
is, the ultimate extension of the Northern 
Cheyenne Reservation to the boundaries 
defined by Tully and the Sioux Commission 
would not come until 1900. By then, several 
more Cheyenne and white settlers would be 
killed in the conflict over the region's finite 
FIG. 3. 
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FIGS. 3-6. Ranching and agriculture on the Northern Cheyenne Reservation, Thomas Bailey Marquis, c. 1920s. 
Courtesy of Buffalo Bill Historical Center, Great Plains People Collection. 
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resources.69 Still, James McLaughlin, the spe-
cial agent dispatched to execute the buyout 
of bona fide white homesteaders and the 
removal of other trespassers, could not help 
but commend the Northern Cheyenne on 
their restraint. In typical backhanded fashion, 
McLaughlin noted, 
The anomalous conditions that have existed 
upon the Northern Cheyenne Reservation 
have been very unsatisfactory, in conse-
quence of which white settlers have suf-
fered financial loss and advancement of the 
Indians greatly retarded, and it is only to be 
wondered at that the Northern Cheyennes, 
who are among the least civilized of any of 
the Indian tribes, conducted themselves so 
peaceably during the past fourteen years on 
that reservation.7° 
McLaughlin's report noted the "great deal of 
friction between whites and Indians" caused 
by these "anomalous conditions," but its focus 
remained on providing a detailed plan and 
budget to rectify the situation, complete with 
inventories of white-owned property and pre-
liminary purchase agreements. Presented to 
Congress and the president in November 1898, 
President McKinley issued an executive order 
enlarging the reservation to its present bound-
aries on March 19, 1900.71 This time, Congress 
and the president acted in unison, and the 
Indian Appropriations Act of 1900 included 
funds for the reservation's extensionP With 
the last of the white settlers removed from the 
reservation in 1904-a full twenty years after 
the original grant of a reserve-the Northern 
Cheyenne had finally secured a place of their 
own. 
CONCLUSION 
There is little typical about the Northern 
Cheyenne's reclamation of a small portion of 
their traditional homeland. What seems cer-
tain is that on the heels of the most celebrated 
Indian victory of the nineteenth century, 
federal efforts to defeat this tribe resulted in 
the scattering of various Northern Cheyenne 
bands across the West and Midwest. From this 
fragmented situation, one Northern Cheyenne 
group struggled against innumerable odds to 
return to Montana, where they worked tire-
lessly to establish a home to which others could 
also return. In an era when the overwhelming 
majority of Native Americans were losing 
their land base, the fact that the Northern 
Cheyenne were able to not only secure a reser-
vation where there was none, but also expand 
its acreage by the turn of the century demon-
strates the exceptional nature of their account. 
To stop there would be to deliver a remark-
able story of Indian agency that many western 
narratives often neglect. Even those histories 
that recognize the incredible resilience of this 
tribe, however, tend to focus on their com-
bative exploits and fail to capture other, more 
crucial factors that produced the Northern 
Cheyenne Reservation. Far beyond raw deter-
mination and martial expertise, the Northern 
Cheyenne displayed a remarkable ability to 
adapt to changing conditions in the Northern 
Plains and adopt those customs most likely to 
provide material security and local sovereignty. 
Foremost among these was a willingness to 
engage in settled agricultural and ranching, 
which the Northern Cheyenne believed would 
bring them subsistence, control over their own 
lives, and a cooperative relationship with the 
federal government. Early efforts upon their 
return to Montana seemed to validate this strat-
egy, as the group cultivated land, raised cattle, 
and were even rewarded with an official reser-
vation. Far from the heroic yet irrational sav-
ages of popular myth, the Northern Cheyenne 
understood how their 1877 defeat and dispersal 
altered power dynamics in the Northern Plains 
and took pragmatic steps to adapt their lifestyles 
to reclaim some sovereignty. 
In some ways, however, the Northern Chey-
enne fell victim to their own early successes. 
With the establishment of the reservation, other 
Cheyenne groups around the country sought to 
join their brethren's attempt at settled living in 
the Tongue River and Rosebud Creek valleys. 
This influx of population strained area resources 
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while federal officials struggled to efficiently and 
fairly reallocate diminishing provisions. Those 
incoming Cheyenne were forced to settle in less 
desirable areas not already occupied, and their 
productivity suffered accordingly. Combined 
with disastrous weather conditions during the 
first few years of the reservation, life back at 
home was not as imagined, but instead became a 
desperate business of survival. 
Of course, the Northern Cheyenne were not 
simply free to pursue any mode of subsistence 
to survive these terrible conditions. Federal 
officials and local whites intent on aiding the 
Northern Cheyenne carried preconceived 
notions of how the Indians must subsist in 
order to evolve into yeoman American farmers. 
Conceiving of the reservation as an incubator 
for this process, Anglo allies worked hard to 
constrain the Northern Cheyenne within this 
idealized agricultural landscape and were slow 
to discover the inadequacy of the assigned 
land base. 
Moreover, though this broken country of 
sheltered valleys and ample water supplies had 
previously provided sufficient resources, a pow-
erful new element limited Indian access. After 
the 1877 surrender of Sioux and Northern 
Cheyenne forces, white settlers flooded into 
the region seeking to take advantage of the 
same benevolent environments the Northern 
Cheyenne valued. Beyond simply adding more 
competitors for the region's resources, these 
newcomers envisioned the surrounding land-
scape as ideal ranching country best exploited 
by large-scale, white-owned operations, not 
nomadic savages incapable of "progressing" 
into settled agriculturalists. Because this land-
scape vision left no room for Indian cultivators, 
white ranchers worked to undermine Northern 
Cheyenne subsistence efforts and consistently 
argued the Indian presence was a threat to the 
region's peace and prosperity. When desper-
ate conditions moved individual Northern 
Cheyenne to commit "depredations," these 
acts served only to validate ranchers' claims 
that Indians were incapable of civilized living. 
Recast as savages once again, violence amongst 
the races seemed justified. 
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Fortunately for the Northern Cheyenne, 
the federal government had seen enough vio-
lence on the Northern Plains. Exhausted by 
years of war with various tribes, the govern-
ment took a different tack in the 1890s by 
appointing several commissions to investigate 
Indian conditions and to propose peaceful, if 
not always entirely equitable, solutions. The 
Northern Cheyenne were beneficiaries of this 
new approach and worked hard to demonstrate 
the tribe's recent history of cooperation, their 
willingness to engage in "civilized" agricultural 
pursuits, and the terrible conditions present 
on the reservation. Faced with this set of facts, 
federal officials chose a new path, interven-
ing to remove troublesome whites and extend 
the boundaries of the Northern Cheyenne 
Reservation. Though this extension was 
certainly the product of Indian agency, it is 
important to be specific about the particular 
form this agency took. Moving beyond the 
romantic tales of Indian violence that often 
obscure more than they reveal, the Northern 
Cheyenne's pragmatic adoption of non-Indian 
subsistence practices secured and later enlarged 
their reservation. 
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